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Trivial Rights
Philip A. Hamburgd
In the summer of 1789, when the House of Representatives
was formulating the amendments that became the Bill of Rights,
Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts argued against enumerating
the right of assembly. The House, he urged, "might have gone
into a very lengthy enumeration of rights; they might have de-
clared that a man should have a right to wear his hat if he
pleased, that he might get up when he pleased, and go to bed
when he thought proper ... [Was] it necessary to list these trifles
in a declaration of rights, under a Government where none of
them were intended to be infringed"?'
Two centuries later, some scholars have quoted Sedgwick's
comments and some other late eighteenth century discussions of
"trivial" rights as evidence that early Americans recognized unwrit-
ten rights. For example, Terry Brennan has quoted Sedgwick's
remarks to illustrate that "[t]he Founders believed that natural
rights were superior to positive law and the Constitution" and that
the judiciary had power "to vindicate" such rights.2 Gene Nichol
has also quoted Sedgwick as evidence of "non-textual constitutional
rights," arguing that "U]ust because the Bill of Rights chooses not
to protect trivial interests does not mean ... that no trivial rights
exist."3 With greater caution, Randy Barnett has emphasized that
* The author very gratefully acknowledges the generous financial support of the
Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation and the helpful comments of Richard S. Kay, Ira
C. Lupu, Robert E. Park and Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.
I CREATING THE BILL. OF RIGHTS 159-60 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991) (statement
of Theodore Sedgwivck, Aug. 15, 1789). Sedgwick also argued : "[lIt is certainly a thing
that never would be called in qtestion . . . ." Id. at 159.
2 Terry Brennan, Natural Rights and the Constitution: the Original "Original Intent", 15
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL' 965, 969 (1992); see also 1014-15. For his quotation of Sedgwick,
see id. at 1013.
3 Gene R. Nichol, Children of Distant Fathers: Sketching an Ethos of Constitutional Lib-
erty, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1305, 1314-15; see also id. at 1305-16. For his quotation from
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"the text does not provide judges with specific guidance" about
unenumerated rights, but noting Sedgwick's animadversions,
Barnett argues that some specific unenumerated rights are judicial-
ly enforceable because they were intended by the framers and
ratifiers. In addition, he argues that other unenumerated rights
can be protected by our adopting "a justificatory presumption of
liberty that puts the burden on government to show that any inter-
ference with .. .the rights retained by the people is justified."'
This scholarship that briefly touches upon trivial rights is part
of a much more extensive literature on unenumerated rights,
which takes for granted that unenumerated rights were unwritten
and, indeed, in some tension with the written constitution adopted
by the people.' Perhaps disappointed by the brief enumeration of
rights in the U.S. Constitution, many scholars have struggled to
find other or broader rights either through expansive interpreta-
tion of the relatively few rights specifically mentioned there or
through theories about unwritten rights. In so doing, large num-
bers of these scholars assume that unenumerated rights were not
identified by the written constitution and in this sense were un-
written. They also seem to assume that these unwritten rights were
in conflict with the written constitution-a conflict they harmonize
by interpreting the Ninth Amendment to have referred to such
Sedgwvick, see id. at 1313.
4 Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Unenumerated Constitutional Rights and the Rule of Lau,
14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 615, 627-30 (1991). Unlike some other scholars who have dis-
cussed trivial rights, Professor Barnett frequently appears to distinguish his proposals from
the history, yet even he reveals an inclination to reify unenumerated rights. See infra note
13; see also Calvin R. Massey, The Natural Law Component of the Ninth Amendment, 61 U.
CIN. L. REv. 49, 83-84 (1992).
5 See supra notes 2, 3 & 4; see also JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THE-
ORY OF JUDICIAL. REVIEW 34-41 (1980); BENNET B. PATTERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH
AMENDMENT 51-56 (1955); Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: The Ninth Amendment and Consti-
tutional Legitimacy, 64 CHI.-KE,,Tr L. REV. 37, 56-64 (1988); Charles Black, On Reading and
Using the Ninth Amendment, in POWER AND PoI.IKW IN QUEST OF LAV: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
EUGENE VICTOR ROSTOW 187 (Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman eds., 1985);
Edward S. Corvin, The "Higher Law'" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 HARV.
L. REX,. 149, 152-53 (1928); Thomas C. Grey, The Uses of an Unwritten Constitution, 64
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 211, 212 (1988); Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Rhetoric and the Ninth
Amendment, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 131, 134-35 (1988); Norman Redlich, Are There "Certain
Rights ...Retained by the People". 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 787 (1962); Lawrence G. Sager, You
Can Raise the First, Hide Behind the Fourth, and Plead the Fifth. But What On Earth Can You
Do With the Ninth Amendmentl 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 239, 241 (1988); Suzanna Sherry, The
Ninth Amendment: Righting and Unwritten Constitution, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1001, 1001
(1988); Suzanna Sherry, The Founder's Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127
(1987).
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unwritten, unenumerated rights.' From this perspective, unwritten
rights could trump the positive law of the Constitution.
Ironically, by assuming that unenumerated rights were unwrit-
ten and in tension with the text, modem advocates of
unenumerated rights have rejected the Constitution's written foun-
dation for unenumerated rights. As is well known, the framers of
the Constitution and the advocates of its ratification, the Federal-
ists, opposed an enumeration of rights on the ground that rights
were better protected by an enumeration of powers. They assumed
that by enumerating federal powers, the people would remain free
from the federal government in other respects and thereby would
retain innumerably many rights. Thus, the people's unenumerated
rights were not unwritten, for they were reserved by the
Constitution's grant of powers to the federal government. In the
language of the Ninth Amendment, the rights retained by the
people were those reserved to the people by the Constitution-if
not through an enumeration of rights, then at least through an
enumeration of powers.7
In taking for granted that the unenumerated rights retained
by the people were those generally reserved by the writing, the
framers and Federalists did not doubt that there were also other,
largely unwritten protections for rights, but they typically under-
stood these other protections to be not so much legal as structur-
al, political, social and cultural. Although several of these unwrit-
ten protections were widely discussed, only one, the people's virtue
or spirit of liberty, will be examined here, because it was the one
Federalists employed in their analysis of trivial rights. Federalists
argued that the people's virtue or spirit of liberty would be far
6 See supra note 5; see also Brennan, supra note 2, at 1014-19; Nichol, supra note 3,
at 1315; Barnett, supra note 4, at 629; Randy E. Barnett, Introduction: James Madison's
Ninth Amendment in RANDY E. BARNETr, THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE-THE HIS-
TORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT 18 (1989) [hereinafter Barnett, Ninth
Amendment]. See generally id. at 1-49.
7 See, e.g., Raoul Berger, The Ninth Amendment, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1980); Rich-
ard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections
and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. RE%,. 226, 271 (1988); William Van Alstyne, Slouching Toward
Bethlehem with the Ninth Amendment, 91 YALE LJ. 207 (1981) (reviewing CHARLES BLACK,
DECISION ACCORDING TO LAW (1981)). For reasons of convenience, this essays follows the
convention of distinguishing between "rights" and "powers"---that is, the rights of individ-
uals and the powers of the federal government.
To the extent some framers and ratifiers assumed that there were unwritten reser-
vations of rights against the federal government, they typically assumed that such powers
and rights were those implied by the writing or by the structure or character of the
government it established.
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more important for the preservation of rights than any written
protection. In contrast to Anti-Federalists, who tended to assume
that any right not enumerated was lost, Federalists argued that
even enumerated rights would be preserved only while the spirit
of liberty remained strong-that paper protections were of little
use in the absence of the cultural and political conditions condu-
cive to freedom.
These written and unwritten protections for unenumerated
rights form the context in which trivial rights should be under-
stood. When Anti-Federalists demanded the enumeration of the
rights they considered essential for the protection of liberty, Feder-
alists mocked their opponents for seeking the enumeration of
rights Federalists considered unlikely to be infringed. There was
no reason to fear for the rights that concerned Anti-Federalists if
Americans had not granted power over such rights and, moreover,
were vigilant of their liberty. On these grounds, many Federalists
viewed as trivial the rights Anti-Federalists said it was essential to
enumerate. Such rights were "trivial" in the sense that they did
not require or deserve the specific protection that came with enu-
meration.
Yet Federalists did not thereby suggest that the rights Anti-
Federalists sought to enumerate were undesirable or unworthy of
protection. On the contrary, many of these rights would, to some
extent, be protected by the enumeration of powers-by the gener-
al reservation of undifferentiated rights. Moreover, the rights of
the people, enumerated or not, depended less upon the
Constitution's paper reservation of rights than upon the various
structural, political, social and cultural constraints on government.
Such constraints-not least, the people's virtue or spirit of liber-
ty-would be the most substantial protection for rights and would
preserve freedom even from federal authority. On these assump-
tions, Federalists argued that innumerable unenumerated rights
were already protected-both by the written grant of powers and,
more substantially, by the people themselves. Two hundred years
after Federalists mocked their opponents for seeking to enumerate
"trivial" rights, their taunts remain sharp reminders as to how the
framers and Federalists assumed our unenumerated rights would
be protected.'
8 Of course, this is not to say that trivial rights are the only lens through which
the Constitution's treatment of unenumerated rights can be examined. The enumeration
of powers, the Bill of Rights, judicial review and the Ninth and Tenth Amendments,
[Vol. 70:1
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I. FEDERALISTS ON THE DANGER OF AN INCOMPLETE
ENUMERATION OF RIGHTS
Before turning to trivial rights, this essay must examine the
concerns of the framers and Federalists about enumeration, for
their fears about enumeration were the basis upon which they
developed their conception of trivial rights. When Anti-Federalists
demanded amendments enumerating rights, Federalists were ada-
mantly opposed. They suspected that the proposed amendments
would be used to prevent ratification of the Constitution and that
at least some of the amendments would deprive the new federal
government of its efficacy. Yet these were not the only Federalist
objections. Federalists also questioned the value of an enumeration
of rights as a means of protecting rights. Distrustful of enumera-
tion, the framers and Federalists sought to protect rights by enu-
merating powers.'
Federalists argued that an enumeration of rights would be
dangerous because it was impossible to specify all of the rights
held against the federal government. For example, with regard to
the rights of individuals, James Iredell argued: "A bill of rights ...
would . . .be . . .dangerous. No man, let his ingenuity be what it
will, could enumerate all the individual rights not relinquished by
this Constitution.""° Speaking of the rights of the states against
the federal government, Governor Bowdoin of Massachusetts ob-
served that "[t]he rights of particular States ... would require a
volume to describe them, as they extend to every subject of legisla-
tion, not included in the powers vested in Congress."1 In other
among other subjects, also offer useful perspectives on unenumerated rights. For some
important and illuminating discussions, see, e.g, Kay, supra note 7, at 271; Walter Berns,
Judicial Reviewr and the Rights and Laws of Nature, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 49; Thomas B.
McAffee, The Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 90 COLUM. L. REN,. 1215, 1249-59
(1990); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Original Purpose of the Bill of Rights: James Madison and
the Founders' Search for a Wor*able Balance Between Federal and State Power, 26 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 126 (1989). Note that these articles shed light on the structure of government and
other protections for liberty that were not discussed directly in connection with trivial
rights.
9 Federalist concerns about enumeration have been discussed by a substantial num-
ber of scholars. For examples of different perspectives, see Barnett, supra note 4, at 626;
Massey, supra note 4, at 83-87; McAffee, supra note 8, at 1249-59.
10 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEERAL. STATE CONVrENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 149 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1941) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES]
(statement of James Iredell at N.C. Rat. Convention, July 28, 1788).
11 16 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 290
n.15 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1986) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HiS-
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words, the freedom of individuals or states was so extensive it
could not practicably be reduced to a list of particulars. 2
For individuals, the innumerable and therefore unenumerable
rights most prominently included natural rights. Many modern
scholars reify natural rights and talk about them as if they were
somehow enforceable as such."3 Eighteenth-century Americans,
however, tended to discuss their natural rights as portions of their
natural liberty-as portions of the general freedom of individuals
in the state of nature. This freedom of individuals in the absence
of government was what Americans generically described as "life,
liberty and property" or, sometimes, as "life, liberty and the pur-
suit of happiness." 4 Some of this freedom was said to be sacri-
TORY] (editors and publication dates vary from volume to volume) (statement of James
Bowdoin at Mass. Rat. Convention, January 23, 1788). More generally, Bowdoin said:
The rights of particular States and private citizens not being the object or sub-
ject of the Constitution, they are incidentally mentioned . . . . in regard to the
latter, as all government is founded on the relinquishment of personal rights in
a certain degree, there was a clear impropriety in being very particular about
them.
Id.
12 Alexander Contee Hanson wrote:
I apprehend, that a bill of rights might not be this innocent quieting instru-
ment. Had the convention entered on the work, they must have comprehended
within it every thing, which the citizens of the United States claim as a natural
or a civil right. An omission of a single article would have caused more discon-
tent, than is either felt, or pretended, on the present occasion.
ARISTIDES [AI.EXANDER CONTEE HANSON], REMARKS ON THE PROPOSED PLAN OF A FEDERAL
GOV'ERNMENT, (January 31, 1788), reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 11, at
537. In response to Anti-Federalist claims that the framers had already risked a bill of
rights, Jasper Yeates argued:
But it is asked, as some rights are here expressly provided for, why should not
more? In truth, however, the writ of habeas corpus and the trial by jury in crimi-
nal cases cannot be considered as a bill of rights, but merely as a reservation on
the part of the people and a restriction on the part of their rulers; and I agree
with those gentlemen who conceive that a bill of rights, according to the ideas
of the opposition, would be accompanied with considerable difficulty and dan-
ger, for, it might be argued at a future day by the persons then in power-you
undertook to enumerate the rights which you meant to reserve, the pretension
which you now make is not comprised in that enumeration, and consequently,
our jurisdiction is not circumscribed.
2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 11, at 437 (statement of Jasper Yeates at Pa. Rat.
Convention, Nov. 30, 1787).
13 Barnett, supra note 4, at 624-40; Brennan, supra note 2, at 1014-19; Nichol, supra
note 3, at 1315; see also Barnett, Ninth Amendment, supra note 6, at 18. See generally id. at
1-49.
14 For some illustrations, see Philip A. Hamburger, Equality and Diversity: The Eigh-
teenth-Centuy Debate About Equal Protection and Equal Civil Rights, 1992 SUP. Cr. REv. 295,
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ficed to government to enable it to provide protection for the
remainder, the protection of this remaining freedom being the
object or end of government. Thus, when lecturing on the forma-
tion of government, the President of Princeton, John Witherspoon,
observed that "[t]he rights of subjects in a social state cannot be
enumerated, but they may be all summed up in protection, that is
to say, those who have surrendered part of their natural rights
expect the strength of the public arm to defend and improve what
remains." 5 Another American of Scottish origin, James Wilson,
remarked that not even the varied tomes on natural law complete-
ly enumerated the rights of men:
Is it a maxim in forming governments, that not only all the
powers which are given, but also that all those which are re-
served, should be enumerated? I apprehend, that the powers
given and reserved form the whole rights of the people as men
and as citizens. I consider that there are very few who under-
stand the whole of these rights. All the political writers, from
Grotius and Puffendorf down to Vattel, have treated on this
subject; but in no one of those books, nor in the aggregate of
them all, can you find a complete enumeration of rights, ap-
pertaining to the people as men and as citizens."
Shortly later, he expostulated: "Enumerate all the rights of men! I
am sure, sir, that no gentleman in the late Convention would have
attempted such a thing."7
To preserve innumerably many rights from the power of the
federal government-to avoid limiting freedom to such rights as
could be listed-the framers left most rights to be defined by the
enumeration of federal powers. The Constitution, explained Feder-
304. In Lockean terms, all of these could be summed up simply as "property." JOHN
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 395 (Il.ix.123) (1963). For purposes of political
analysis, the state of nature typically was understood to be an abstract condition rather
than an historical time or place. Therefore natural rights could be defined by the ab-
sence of subjection to others, with or without reference to primitive cultural and eco-
nomic conditions. For example, not only the right to eat but also the right to shave
could be considered a natural right. Put another way, natural rights were the rights or
the freedom of individuals as individuals. Hence, the synonymous labels, "human rights"
or "rights of men."
15 JOHN WITHERSPOON, AN ANNOTATED EDITION OF LECTURES ON MORAL PHILOSOPHY
(Lecture XII) (Of Civil Society) 141 (Jack Scott ed., 1982).
16 2 DOCUMENrrARY HISTORY, supra note 11, at 470 (statement of James Wilson at Pa.
Rat. Convention, Dec. 4, 1787).
17 Id.; see also infra text at note 20 and infra notes 24, 35 and 43.
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alists, enumerated powers and thereby avoided the danger of an
incomplete enumeration of rights. For example, Wilson cautioned:
[I]n a government consisting of enumerated powers, such as is
proposed for the United States, a bill of rights would not only
be unnecessary, but, in my humble judgment, highly impru-
dent. In all societies, there are many powers and rights, which
cannot be particularly enumerated. A bill of rights annexed to
a constitution is an enumeration of the powers reserved. If we
attempt an enumeration, everything that is not enumerated is
presumed to be given. The consequence is, that an imperfect
enumeration would throw all implied power into the scale of
the government; and the rights of the people would be ren-
dered incomplete."8
This danger of omitting a valuable right could be avoided with a
list of powers:
On the other hand, an imperfect enumeration of the powers of
government reserves all implied power to the people; and, by
that means the constitution becomes incomplete; but of the
two it is much safer to run the risk on the side of the constitu-
tion; for an omission in the enumeration of the powers of
government is neither so dangerous, nor important, as an omis-
sion in the enumeration of the rights of the people.' 9
A list of powers was the safer alternative; it could provide a gener-
al and therefore complete reservation of rights.
18 2 DOCUMENTARY HIsTORY, supra note 11, at 388 (statement of James Wilson at Pa.
Rat. Convention, Nov. 28, 1787). In his famous State House speech, Wilson said:
When the people established the powers of legislation under their separate gov-
ernments, they invested their representatives with every right and authority which
they did not in explicit terms reserve; and therefore upon every question, re-
specting the jurisdiction of the house of assembly, if the frame of government is
silent, the jurisdiction is efficient and complete. But in delegating federal pow-
ers, another criterion was necessarily introduced, and the congressional authority
is to be collected, not from tacit implication, but from the positive grant ex-
pressed in the instrument of union. Hence it is evident, that in the former case
everything which is not reserved is given, but in the latter the reverse of the
proposition prevails, and everything which is not given, is reserved. This dis-
tinction being recognized, will furnish an answer to those who think the omis-
sion of a bill of rights, a defect in the proposed Constitution ....
James Wilson, Speech in the State House Yard (Oct. 6, 1787), in 2 id. at 167-68. See also
9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 11, at 1080 (statement of Henry Lee at Va. Rat.
Convention, June 9, 1788).
19 2 DOCUMENrTARY HISTORY, supra note 11, at 388 (statement of James Wilson at Pa.
Rat. Convention, Nov. 28, 1787).
[Vol. 70:1
TRIVIAL RIGHTS
Wilson was not alone in arguing that an enumeration of
fights was dangerous. For example, an anonymous Federalist
wrote:
It is well known that several of the states on the continent have
never made any formal declaration of their fights. Well aware
of the impossibility of enumerating all those blessings to which
by nature they were entitled, and highly sensible of the danger
there was intrusting to their recollection of them (knowing that
when once they attempted to set to them legal bounds, what
ever should by chance be left out, was of course given up)
some of the states more prudently thought fit to enumerate on
the other hand what should be the powers of their govern-
ment, when of course whatever was omited [sic] on that side,
remained as their natural and inviolable fights on the other.
And but few states in the world have deemed it safe to do
otherwise."
Similarly, Madison said:
As to a solemn declaration of our essential rights, he thought it
unnecessary and dangerous-Unnecessary, because it was evi-
dent that the General Government had no power but what was
given it, and the delegation alone warranted the exercise of
power-Dangerous, because an enumeration which is not com-
plete, is not safe. Such an enumeration could not be made
within any compass of time, as would be equal to a general
negation .... 21
As Hamilton concluded, "[t]he truth is, after all the declamations
we have heard, that the Constitution is itself, in every rational
sense, and to every useful purpose, A BILL OF RIGHTS.....
[T]he proposed Constitution, if adopted, will be the bill of rights
of the Union."
22
20 "The State Soldier" No. II, Feb. 6, 1788, -eprinted in 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, su-
pra note 11, at 352.
21 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 11, at 1507 (statement of James Madison at
Va. Rat. Convention, June 24, 1788); see also 10 id. at 1502.
22 THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 560-61 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward M. Earle ed.,
1950). Additionally, Hamilton insisted:
[B]ills of rights, in the sense and to the extent in which they are contended
for, are not only unnecessary in the proposed Constitution, but would even be
dangerous. . . . Why, for instance, should it be said that the liberty of the press
shall not be restrained, when no power is given by which retrictions may be im-
posed? I will not contend that such a provision would confer a regulating pow-
er but it is evident that it would furnish, to men disposed to usurp, a plausible
pretence for claiming that power.
19941
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just as Federalists questioned the safety of enumerating rights,
so too some Federalists revealed a concern about the list of feder-
al powers. Although most Federalists argued that the Constitution
had successfully enumerated federal powers and thereby had limit-
ed federal authority, a few also acknowledged-what the framers
clearly had taken into account-that it was impossible to enumer-
ate all of the powers Congress might require. Madison explained:
Had the convention attempted a positive enumeration of the
powers necessary and proper for carrying their other powers
into effect, the attempt would have involved a complete digest
of laws on every subject to which the Constitution relates; ac-
commodated too, not only to the existing state of things, but
to all the possible changes which futurity may produce; for in
every new application of a general power, the particular powers,
which are the means of attaining the object of the general pow-
er, must always necessarily vary with that object, and be often
properly varied whilst the object remains the same.2"
A complete list of the particular means the federal government
would need to carry out its enumerated powers was simply not
possible. Nonetheless, by distinguishing between general powers
and the particular means of carrying them out, Madison could
preserve the essential Federalist argument that the powers of the
federal government had all been enumerated. He could argue that
the document did, in fact, enumerate all general federal powers
and that the Necessary and Proper Clause merely concerned the
means of carrying out the general powers.
24
Id. at 559; see also, e.g., "Plain Truth," Reply to An Officer of the Late Continental Army, INDE-
PENDENT GAZETTEER, Nov. 10, 1787, reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 11,
at 218.
23 THE FEDERALIST, supra note 22, No. 44, at 293-94 (James Madison). He continued:
Had they attempted to enumerate the particular powers or means not necessary
or proper for carrying the general powers into execution, the task would have
been no less chimerical; and would have been liable to this further objection,
that every defect in the enumeration would have been equivalent to a positive
grant of authority.
Id. at 294. The Necessary and Proper standard was fixed and permanent, although under
this standard there would be changes in the particular powers the government could use
to carry out the general powers that were enumerated.
24 Later, when proposing what became the Bill of Rights, Madison qualified his
arguments about the efficacy of the enumeration of powers and acknowledged that the
Necessary and Proper Clause wras one of the reasons why a bill of rights was useful:
It has been said that in the federal government they [declarations of rights] are
unnecessary, because the powers are enumerated, and it follows that all that are
not granted by the constitution are retained: that the constitution is a bill of
[Vol. 70:1
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Later, when Madison introduced his proposals for what be-
came the Bill of Rights, he continued to worry about the danger
of enumerating-particularly the danger of enumerating rights
held against the federal government. A year after the ratification
of the Constitution, and in the wake of demands from some of his
constituents, Madison presented the House of Representatives with
his proposal for a bill of rights. He hoped it would "satisfy the
public mind that their liberties will be perpetual, and this without
endangering any part of the constitution . . . considered as essen-
tial to the existence of the government by those who promoted its
adoption."25 In proposing a bill of rights, however, Madison could
hardly forget his own arguments that, if rights against the federal
government were enumerated, the failure to mention a right
might be interpreted to imply federal power. Therefore, he took
care to prohibit such an interpretation with the following:
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the constitution, made in
favor of particular rights, shall not be so construed as to dimin-
ish the just importance of other rights retained by the people;
or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the constitution; but
either as actual limitations of such powers, or as inserted mere-
ly for greater caution.2-
This was later reduced to the more familiar statement that, "[t]he
enumeration . . . of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny
or disparage others retained by the people."27 With these words,
powers, the great residuum being the rights of the people; and therefore a bill
of rights cannot be so necessary as if the residuum was thrown into the hands
of the government. I admit that these arguments are not entirely without foun-
dation; but they are not conclusive to the extent which has been supposed. It is
true the powers of the general government are circumscribed, they are directed
to particular objects; but even if government keeps within those limits, it has
certain extraordinary powers with respect to the means, which may admit of
abuse to a certain extent .... because in the constitution of the United States
there is a clause granting to Congress the power to make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into execution all the powers ....
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 82 (statement of James Madison, June 8,
1789). For prior Anti-Federalist arguments, see infra text at note 33.
25 Id. at 79-80. For Madison's political goals in proposing a bill of rights, see Paul
Finkelman, James Madison and the Bill of Rights: A Relucant Paternity, 1990 SUP. CT. RE'.
301; Wilfred E. Rumble, James Madison on the Vatue of Bills of Rights, in NOOs XX:
CONSTITLrrTONALISM 122, 133 (j. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1979).
26 James Madison's Resolution (June 8, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS,
supra note 1, at 13.
27 U.S. CONST. amend. IX. For the history of the Ninth Amendment, see Kay, supra
note 7, at 269-73; McAffee, supra note 8. The literature that takes another view of the
1994]
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the Ninth Amendment ensured that the Bill of Rights would be
understood, not as the sole definition of federal power, but rather
merely as a list of "particular exceptions to the grant of pow-
er, "28 -as an enumeration of exceptions to the enumeration of
powers. Thus, even when drafting the Bill of Rights, Federalists
still sought to avoid the danger of enumerating innumerable
rights.
II. ANTI-FEDERALISTS ON THE DANGER OF LEAVING
RIGHTS UNENUMERATED
Whereas Federalists drew attention to the danger of listing
rights, Anti-Federalists emphasized the danger of leaving rights un-
specified. According to many Anti-Federalists, unmentioned rights
were without significant constitutional protection.
Although many Anti-Federalists appear to have understood
that the rights of individuals and states were innumerable, they
tended, nonetheless, to be relatively indifferent to the dangers of
listing rights. Of course, some Anti-Federalists did directly address
the arguments of the Federalists that an incomplete enumeration
was likely to be hazardous. For example, the "Federal Farmer"
acknowledged that a bill of rights would be "dangerous, as individ-
ual rights are numerous, and not easy to be enumerated in a bill
of rights;" he admitted that "it may be inferred, that others not
mentioned are surrendered.129 As Professor Thomas McAffee has
observed, the "Federal Farmer" addressed this problem with a
solution similar to what became the Ninth Amendment: "there are
infinite advantages in particularly enumerating many of the most
essential rights reserved in all cases; and as to the less important
ones, we may declare in general terms, that all not expressly sur-
rendered are reserved."" Other Anti-Federalists, however, simply
Ninth Amendment is carefully reviewed in Professor McAffee's excellent article. Among
other things, he shows that a version of what became the Ninth Amendment was pro-
posed by the "Federal Farmer." See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
28 CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 83 (statement of James Madison,
June 8, 1789). In similar language, Hamilton had earlier explained that a bill of rights
would be dangerous, because it "would contain various exceptions to powers not grant-
ed . . . . I will not contend that . . . a provision [for the liberty of the press] would
confer a regulating power; but it is evident that it would furnish, to men disposed to
usurp, a plausible pretence for claiming that power." THE FEDERALIST, supra note 22, No.
84, at 559 (Alexander Hamilton).
29 "Federal Farmer," Jan. 20, 1788, repinted in 2 THE COMPLETE A.NTI-FEDERALIST 323-
24 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
30 Id., discussed by McAffee, supra note 8, at 1275. Although most Anti-Federalists in-
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minimized the risks of including an incomplete list in the Consti-
tution. For example, after reviewing the rights that the framers
had been willing to specify in the body of the Constitution, Robert
Whitehill asked: "if there was 'danger in the attempt to enumerate
the liberties of the people, lest it should prove imperfect and de-
fective, how happens it, that in the instances I have mentioned,
that danger has been incurred?""1 By implication, the warnings of
Federalists against an incomplete bill of rights were not to be
taken seriously.
Indeed, Anti-Federalists typically did not even allude to the
danger of listing rights but rather merely asserted that at least
some rights-important rights-should have been enumerated.
Unlike Federalists, who pointed to the hazards of an incomplete
enumeration, Anti-Federalists argued that even a partial list was
better than none. As Jefferson wrote to Madison, "half a loaf is
better than no bread," and "if we cannot secure all our rights, let
us secure what we can."32 Anti-Federalists had little confidence
that the people's virtue or spirit of liberty could survive for long
under the federal government or could effectively constrain it. Nor
did Anti-Federalists have faith that the enumeration of powers
would substantially limit the new government, for the enumeration
of powers had been supplemented by the Necessary and Proper
Clause and would be expansively interpreted by the federal judi-
ciary." Therefore, only by specifying rights could the Constitution
sisted that they could retain their rights only by enumerating them, one Anti-Federalist
said that a clause reserving to the states powers not expressly granted to Congress "would
have superseded the necessity of a bill of rights." 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 10, at
152 (statement of Samuel Spencer at N.C. Rat. Convention, July 4, 1788). Later, he again
argued, "Such a clause would render a bill of rights unnecessary." 4 id. at 163 (July 29,
1788).
31 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 11, at 427 (statement of Robert Whitehill at
Pa. Rat. Convention, Nov. 30, 1787). He continued:
Have the people no other rights worth their attention, or is it to be inferred,
agreeably to the maxim of our opponents, that every other right is abandoned?
'.. [T]he argument of difficulty, which has been drawn from the attempt to
enumerate every right, cannot now be urged against the enumeration of more
rights than this instrument contains.
Id. For the response of Jasper Yeates, see supra note 12.
32 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Mar. 15. 1789), in CREATING
THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 219. This was in response to the objection that "a
positive declaration of some essential rights could not be obtained in the requisite lati-
tude." Id. Of course, Jefferson was in France and was not exactly an Anti-Federalist.
33 E.g., "Brutus," No. V, N.Y. J., Dec. 13, 1787, repinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTO-
RY, supra note 11, at 423.
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alert the people to infringements of their liberty or induce federal
courts to restrain the federal government. 4 Accordingly, Anti-
Federalists argued that it was better to secure some rights than
none at all and repeatedly demanded enumeration of the "impor-
tant," "essential," and "great" rights of Americans.
How did Anti-Federalists define important or essential rights?
The "Federal Farmer," for example, asked for enumeration of
"those rights which are particularly valuable to individuals, and
essential to the permanency and duration of free government."35
The Anti-Federalist minority of the Pennsylvania ratifying conven-
34 For example, "An Old Whig" wrote of Congressmen who would find expansive
legislative authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause: "[lit is not of a farthing
consequence whether they really are of opinion that the law is necessary and proper, or
only pretend to think so, for who can overrule their pretensions?--No one, unless we had a
bill of rights to which we might appeal, and under which we might contend against any
assumption of undue power and appeal to the judicial branch of the government to
protect us by their judgements." "An Old Whig," No. II, INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER, Oct.
17, 1787, reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 11, at 402. Incidentally, note
the implications of the Anti-Federalist position for judicial review.
35 "Federal Farmer," January 20, 1788, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST,
supra note 29, at 329. Taking a variant of this approach, Jefferson wrote that important
rights were those "which it is useless to surrender to the government, and which yet, gov-
ernments have always been fond to invade." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to David
Humphreys (Mar. 18, 1789), in 14 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 678 (J. Boyd ed.,
1958). Another Anti-Federalist said: "When individuals enter into society, they give up
some rights to secure the rest. There are certain human rights that ought not to be
given up, and which ought in some manner to be secured. With respect to these great
essential rights, no latitude ought to be left." 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 153
(statement of Samuel Spencer at N.C. Rat. Convention, July 29, 1788). "Brntus" tvTote:
There are certain rights which mankind possess, over which government ought
not to have any controul, because it is not necessary they should, in order to
attain the end of its institution. There are certain things which rulers should be
absolutely prohibited from doing, because, if they should do them, they would
work an injury, not a benefit to the people.
"Brutus," No. IX, N.Y. J., Jan. 17, 1788, reprinted in 15 DOCU:MENTARY HISTORY, supra note
11, at 393. "An Old Whig" wrote:
To define what portion of his natural liberty, the subject shall at all times be
entitled to retain, is one great end of a bill of rights. To these may be added
in a bill of rights some particular engagements of protection, on the part of
government, without such a bill of rights, firmly securing the privileges of the
subject, the government is always in danger of degenerating into tyranny ....
"An Old Wrhig," No. IV, INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER, Oct. 27, 1787, reprinted in 13 DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY, supra note 11, at 501. He also wrote:
[W]e ought carefully to guard ourselves by a BILL OF RIGHTS, against the
invasion of those liberties which it is essential for us to retain, which it is of no
real use to government to strip us of; but which in the course of human events
have been too often insulted with all the wantonness of an idle barbarity.
Id. at 502.
[Vol. 70:1
TRIVIAL RIGHTS
ion demanded "a BILL of RIGHTS ascertaining and fundamen-
tally establishing those unalienable and personal rights of men,
without the full, free, and secure enjoyment of which there can be
no liberty, and over which it is not necessary for a good govern-
ment to have the control." 6 More attentive to the risks of seek-
ing the enumeration of what might be considered trivial, the "Im-
partial Examiner" warned:
A cautious people will consider all the inducements to enter
into the social state, from the most important object down to
the minutest prospect of advantage. Every motive with them
will have its due weight. They will not pay a curious attention
to trifles and overlook matters of great consequence:-and in
pursuing these steps they will provide for the attainment of
each point in view with a care-with an earnestness proportion-
ate to its dignity, and according.as it involves a greater or a
lesser interest. It is evident, therefore that they should attend
most diligently to those sacred rights, which they have received
with their birth, and which can neither be retained to them-
selves, nor transmitted to their posterity, unless they are express-
ly reserved .... 3'
Notwithstanding that they reached a very different conclusion,
Federalists could share some of the assumptions implicit in these
arguments for the enumeration of important rights.
Although by demanding the enumeration of important or
essential rights, numerous Anti-Federalists indicated a willingness
to accept an incomplete enumeration of rights, many Anti-Federal-
ists had difficulty bringing their lists to a close. Without high ex-
pectations that the federal government would be adequately re-
strained, either by public sentiment or by the Constitution's enu-
meration of powers, Anti-Federalists assumed that the rights not
specified with particularity would not be protected. On this basis,
many Anti-Federalists appealed-often in tones of undisguised an-
36 The Address and Reasons of the Dissent of the Minority of the Convention, PA. PACKET,
Dec. 18, 1787, reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 11, at 630. After the
Constitution was ratified, some Anti-Federalists from Pennsylvania desired that "such a
declaration of rights may be added to the general frame of government as may secure to
posterity those privileges which are essential to the proper limiting the extent of sover-
eign power, and securing those rights which are essential to freemen . . . ." Amendments
Proposed by Westmoreland County Committee, PITTSBURGH GAZETTE, Sept. 20, 1788, reprinted in
1 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL ELECTIONS 1788-1790, at 278
(Menill Jensen & Robert A. Becker eds., 1976).
37 "Impartial Examiner," VA. INDEPENDENT" CHRON., Feb. 20, 1788, reprinted in 5 THE
COMPLETE A.NTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 29, at 176.
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guish-for remarkably long lists of rights. Some even sought to
enumerate rights that were not clearly important or essential. Most
notably, the dissenting members of the Pennsylvania ratifying con-
vention demanded, in their eighth proposal, the right "to fowl and
hunt in seasonable times, on the lands they hold."38
The general statements of Anti-Federalists confirm that at least
a small number of them were tempted to abandon the distinction
between the important and the trivial. The "Federal Farmer" ap-
pears to have backed away slightly from the standard of listing
only "essential" or "important" rights when he disclaimed that he
wanted to enumerate rights of "inconsiderable importance."39 In-
deed, he subsequently observed that "fundamental rights" were not
the only ones that "ought to be expressly secured," and that "it is
pretty clear, that some other[s] of less importance, or less in dan-
ger, might with propriety also be secured."" Other Anti-Federal-
ists were less subtle. Luther Martin, who regretted "[t]he rejection
of the clauses attempted in favour of particular rights," became
"impressed with the necessity of not merely attempting to secure a
few rights, but of digesting and forming a complete bill of rights,
including those of states and of individuals."4 With a thorough, if
38 The complete proposal was:
8. The inhabitants of the several states shall have liberty to fowl and hunt in
seasonable times, on the lands they hold, and on all other lands in the United
States not enclosed, and in like manner to fish in all navigable waters, and oth-
ers not private property, without being restrained therein by any laws to be
passed by the legislature of the United States.
The Address and Reasons of the Dissent of the Minority of the Convention, PA. PACKET, Dec. 18,
1787, reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 11, at 624. This was different from
the right to bear arms, which had far broader implications, domestic and foreign, than
just a right to fowl and hunt. Indeed, in the Address and Reasons, the immediately
preceeding provision began: "7. That the people have a right to bear arms for the de-
fense of themselves and their own state, or the United States, or for the purpose of
killing game . . . ." Id. at 623-24.
39 "It is not my object to enumerate rights of inconsiderable importance; but there
are others, no doubt, which ought to be established as a fundamental part of the nation-
al system." "Federal Farmer," Nov. 8, 1787, reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 11, at 47. He also wrote that "the people especially having began, ought to go
through enumerating, and establish particularly all the rights of individuals, which can by
any possibility come in question in making and executing federal laws." "Federal Farmer,"
Jan. 20, 1788, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 29, at 327.
40 Id. at 330.
41 Luther Martin, An Address to the Citizens of Maryland, On the Subject of the Federal
Constitution, MD. J., Mar. 21, 1788, reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, sup-a note 11,
at 456.
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naive, understanding of the consequences of Anti-Federalist as-
sumptions, George Turberville declared the necessity of a "very full
and explanatory" bill of rights, in which "not only the Liberty of
the press, the trial by Jury of the vicinage & all those great
points-but even every the most trivial priviledge [sic] that Citi-
zens have a right to possess-shou'd be expressly stipulated and
reserved."42 All rights held against the federal government, "even
every the most trivial" were to be reduced to an express enumera-
tion of particulars.43
III. TRIVIAL RIGHTS
In response to the Anti-Federalist vision of constitutional par-
ticularity, Federalists defended the Constitution's *exclusion of a
bill of rights and in so doing not only spoke generally against an
enumeration of rights but also objected to the enumeration of
some specific categories of rights. Among these were impermanent
rights, implied rights, minutiae, and rights not likely to be in-
fringed-the last being what Federalists were especially apt to
consider trivial.
According to Federalists, constitutions and the rights they
protected were to be permanent, and on this ground, Federalists
42 Letter from George L. Turberville to Arthur Lee (Oct. 28, 1787), in 13 Docu-
MENTARY HISTORY, supra note 11, at 506.
43 One Anti-Federalist considered it "a general rule that wherever the powers of a
government extend to the lives, the persons, and properties of the subject, all their
rights ought to be clearly and expressly defined, othenise they have but a poor security
for their liberties." "A Democratic Federalist," PA. HERALD, Oct. 17, 1787, eprinte4 in 2
DOCUMEN'TARY HISTORY, supra note 11, at 194. "Brutus" wrote that "the most express and
full declaration of rights [ought] to have been made." "Brutus," Nov. 1, 1787, in 2 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 29, at 372. He advocated "expressly reserving to
the people such of their essential natural, rights, as are not necessary to be parted with."
2 id. at 373. Another Anti-Federalist wrote that "there is no restraint in the form of a
bill of rights, to secure (what doctor Blackstone calls) that residuum of human rights,
which is not intended to be given up to society, and which indeed is not necessary to be
given for any good purpose." Richard H. Lee, A Letter to Gov. Edmund Randolph on the
Subject of the Federal Constitution, VA. GAZETTE, Oct. 22, 1787, reprinted in 5 THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERAUT, supra note 29, at 114. With some sarcasm, a Federalist-the Swedish
Lutheran minister, Nicholas Collin-observed that "[m]any tremble under this mighty and
universal sway of a federal government; and would at least have a long bill of rights as a
small security against warrants, jails, inquisitions, prosecutions for libels &c." [Nicholas
Collin], Renarks on the Amendments to the Federal Constitution, No. 28, FED. GAZETTE AND
PHILADELPHIA EVENING POST, No. 119, Feb. 16, 1789.
Incidentally, the German historian,, von Holst, went so far as to allude to the Anti-
Federalists as "the particularists." H. VON HOLST, 1 THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLTIQcAL
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 54-61 (John J. Lalor & Alfred B. Mason trans., 1877).
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opposed the enumeration of rights that might become obsolete."
For example, James Iredell pointed out the risks of enumerating a
right against severe punishments. While rejecting language against
"cruel and unusual punishment" as too vague, Iredell argued that
a more detailed clause either would be ineffectual or would ren-
der the federal government incapable of responding to changing
circumstances:
If... the Convention had enumerated a vast variety of cruel
punishments, and prohibited the use of any of them .... and
if our government had been disposed to be cruel their inven-
tion would only have been put to a little more trouble....
If ... they had determined ... positively what punishments
should [be used], this must have led them into a labyrinth of
detail which in the original constitution of a government would
have appeared perfectly ridiculous, and not left a room for
such changes, according to circumstances, as must be in the
power of every Legislature that is rationally formed.45
44 See Philip A. Hamburger, The Constitution's Accommodation of Social Change, 88
MICH. L. REv. 239, 295-97 (1989). Anti-Federalists often asserted that Americans could
make their rights permanent-or at least as permanent as possible-by enumerating them
in the U.S. Constitution. In contrast, Federalists and even some Anti-Federalists under-
stood that a constitution adapted merely to the circumstances of one age might not be
suited to the circumstances of another and on this account sought an instrument that
would be permanent in the sense that it would not require alteration.
45 JAMES IREDEI.L, ANSWER TO MR. MASON'S OBJECTIONS TO THE NEW CONSTITUTION
(1788), reprinted in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, PUBLISHED
DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE, 1787-1788, at 360 (Paul L. Ford ed., Burt Frank-
lin 1971) (1888) [hereinafter PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION]. Another Federalist
wrote:
Suppose such a bill of rights formed, and the Constitution ratified and in exer-
cise. An adventitious circumstance arises, for which no provision has been made
in the Constitution, and is wholly left out of the bill of rights; from whence
must the power flow to remedy or provide against the evil. By the Constitution
there is no power vested in the government; by the. bill of rights, the people
have lamented the sovereignty retained by them. I believe every man of com-
mon sense would say that the people, or the sovereign power, cannot be affect-
ed by any such declaration of rights, they being the source of all power in the
government; whatever they have not given away still remains inherent in
them . . . . I therefore conclude, had a bill of rights been formed by the late
Convention, the good sense of the people would universally have revolted at
such a display of unjustifiable confidence, founded on a mistaken notion of the
nature of our government and the source from whence all authority in the
United States must necessarily flow.
Reply to George Mason's Objections to the Constitution, NJ. J., Dec. 19, 1787, reprinted in 3
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 11, at 154-55.
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The framers and Federalists sought a document that was already
accommodated to future circumstances rather than one that would
have to be reinterpreted or rewritten to meet new exigencies.
They hoped to make the Constitution's enumeration of rights
permanent by leaving out such rights as might become obsolete,
particularly those that might become impediments to effective
government.
Federalists also objected to the enumeration of rights implied
by other enumerated rights. For example, in the congressional de-
bates about the Bill of Rights, Representative Theodore Sedgwick
of Massachusetts objected to the inclusion of the right of assembly,
in part because "[tihe right will be as fully recognized if the words
are struck out, as if they were retained: For if the people may con-
verse, they must meet for the purpose."46 In short, the right of
assembly was implied by another enumerated right, that of free
speech. Similarly, Madison said of the right to instruct representa-
tives that, to the extent it deserved constitutional protection, it was
already "provided for" by the enumeration of "freedom of
speech."47 A right did not have to be listed if it could be derived
46 CREATING THE BILl. OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 154 (statement of Theodore
Sedgwick, Aug. 15, 1789) (emphasis added). Immediately beforehand, he said: "[T]his is
a self evident unalienable right of the people . . . and it does appear to me below the
dignity of this house, to insert such things in the constitution." Id. at 154. He also said
of what became the First Amendment that:
[H]e feared it would tend to make them appear trifling in the eyes of their
constituents; what, said he, shall we secure the freedom of speech, and think it
necessary at the same time to allow the right of assembling? If people freely
converse together, they must assemble for that purpose ....
Id. at 159. He argued that "if they [the words referring to the right of assembly] were
understood or implied in the word consult, they were utterly unnecessary .... Id. at
161.
47 CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 167 (statement of James Madison,
Aug. 15, 1789). After complaining of the "difficulties arising from discussing and propos-
ing abstract propositions, of which the judgment may not be convinced," Madison said:
I venture to say that if we confine ourselves to an enumeration of simple ac-
knowledged principles, the ratification will meet with but little difficulty. Amend-
ments of a doubtful nature will have a tendency to prejudice the whole system;
the proposition now suggested, partakes highly of this nature; it is doubted by
many gentlemen here . . . . In one sense this declaration is true, in many oth-
ers it is certainly not true; in the sense in which it is true, we have asserted the
right sufficiently in what we have done; if we mean nothing more than this, that
the people have a right to express and communicate their sentiments and wish-
es, we have provided for it already. The right of freedom of speech is secured;
the liberty of the press is expressly declared to be beyond the reach of this gov-
ernment; the people may therefore publicly address their representatives; may
privately advise them, or declare their sentiments by petition to the whole body;
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from a more general enumerated right.
In addition, Federalists accused opponents of the Constitution
of seeking to include in that document the minutiae of a code."
After the Constitution was ratified, one Federalist argued that "if
the Federal Constitution was charged with a minute regulation of
what may be expedient, and how it should be done, in every pos-
sible situation, and with a scrupulous enumeration of all the rights
of the states and individuals, it would make a larger volume than
the Bible . . . " Indeed, as Hamilton protested, "a minute de-
tail of particular rights is certainly far less applicable to a Constitu-
tion like that under consideration, which is merely intended to
regulate the general political interests of the nation, than to a
constitution which has the regulation of every species of personal
in all these ways they may communicate their will. If gentlemen mean to go fur-
ther, and to say that the people have a right to instruct their representatives in
such a sense as that the delegates were obliged to conform to those instructions,
the declaration is not true.
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 167 (statement of James Madison, Aug.
15, 1789).
48 One Federalist wrote:
'Tis objected further that the constitution contains no declaration of rights. I an-
swer this is not true,-the constitution contains a declaration of many rights,
and very important ones, e.g. that people shall be obliged to fulfil their con-
tracts, . . . that no ex-post facto laws shall be made &c. but it was no part of the
business of their appointment to make a code of laws-it was sufficient to fix
the constitution right, and that would pave the way for the most effectual secu-
rity of the rights of the subject.
"A Citizen of Philadelphia," Remarks on the Address of Sixteen Members of the Assembly
of Pennsylvania (Oct. 18, 1787), in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 11, at 302. See
also statement by Iredell, supra text at note 45.
49 [Nicholas Collin], Remarks on the Amendments to the Federal Constitution, No. 2, FED.
GAZETTE AND PHILADELPHIA EVENING POST, No. 21, Oct. 24, 1788. He also wrote:
After all, this childish jealousy would render liberty less secure, because a bold
and artful Congress could safely invade the people through the holes they had
forgot to stop, without any legal charge of treason; as all that was not reserved
in such exact detail, must be supposed fairly granted . . . . [Wie cannot pin a
servant down to stiff minute rules: a blockhead or knave who wants them, is not
worth keeping.
Id. Not only did Anti-Federalists seek enumeration of many rights, but also they disagreed
about the rights to be listed. After reciting some Anti-Federalist proposals, Tench Coxe
observed, "Nor does the account of particulars end here. The objections severally made
by the three honorable gentlemen and the Pennsylhania Minority are so different, and
even discordant . . . that all hope of greater unanimity of opinion . . . must be given
up . . . ." "Philanthropos" [Tench Coxe], PA. GAZETE, Jan. 16, 1788, reprinted in 15
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 11, at 393.
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and private concerns."" Especially in a federal constitution, a de-
tailed list of rights could be considered inappropriate.
Most dramatically, Federalists ridiculed enumerations that
included trivial rights. In mocking Anti-Federalists for seeking to
enumerate trivial rights, Federalists did not merely repeat the
distinction between rights essential to the preservation of liberty
and rights that were not essential. Rather, Federalists urged that it
was unnecessary to specify rights that were trivial in another
sense-typically, in the sense that they were unlikely to be in-
fringed and therefore did not need to be enumerated.
Federalists had varied reasons for questioning the danger to
rights, but in discussing trivial rights, they focused on two particu-
larly salient reasons for considering rights quite safe. First, as al-
ready observed, Federalists argued that the enumeration of powers
had effectively limited the federal government and had left it with
little power over the rights that so concerned Anti-Federalists.
Second, Federalists suggested that the new government would be
influenced by public sentiment and therefore would not be in-
clined to misuse such power as it had. In arguing that the absence
of a bill of rights was not necessarily a defect in the Constitution,
substantial numbers of Federalists had insisted that rights (and
more generally liberty) depended for protection as much upon
popular attitudes-the people's virtue and spirit of liberty-as
upon paper guarantees. "' Even rights enumerated in the Constitu-
50 THE FEDERALIST, supra note 22, No. 84, at 559 (Alexander Hamilton); see also id.,
No. 44, at 293 (James Madison) (discussing enumeration of powers).
51 See, e.g., John Dickinson, Letters of Fabius, in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION, su-
pra note 45, at 186; Noah Webster, Government, 1 AM. MAC. 137, 140 (1788); "Uncus,"
MD. J., Nov. 9, 1787, reprinted in 14 DOCuLMENTARV HISTORY, sun'a note 11, at 77-78, 81;
THE FEDERALIST, supra note 22, No. 83, at 564 (Alexander Hamilton); id., No. 84, at 580
(Alexander Hamilton); Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788),
in 11 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADiSON 297 (Robert A. Rutland & Charles F. Hobson eds.,
1977) [hereinafter MADISON PAPERS]; Letter from George Lee Turberville to James Madi-
son (Apr. 16, 1788), in 11 id. at 24; Letter from G.L. Turberville to James Madison
(June 16, 1789), in 12 id. at 224-25.
A few Federalists took the extreme position that some rights were too important to
be enumerated. After listing various rights, Roger Sherman wrote:
These last are undoubtedly important points, much too important to depend on
mere paper protection. For, guard such privileges by the strongest expressions,
still if you leave the legislative and executive power in the hands of those who
are or may be disposed to deprive you of them-you are but slaves . . . . The
only real security that you can have for all your important rights must be in the
nature of your government.
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tion, they said, required more than paper protection and would
survive only as long as the people's spirit of liberty. 2 Accordingly,
when Anti-Federalists demanded that the Constitution enumerate
rights-particularly when they demanded that it enumerate rights
not clearly within the scope of the enumerated federal pow-
ers-Federalists tended to be skeptical as to whether such rights
really were in any danger. 3
The most familiar statement of the Federalist position oc-
curred after ratification, during the House debates about the Bill
"A Countryman" [Roger Sherman], No. II, NEW HAVEN GAZETTE, Nov. 22, 1787, reprinted
in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 11, at 172, 173. Another Federalist wrote of
"'the liberty of the press'" that:
[It was] a right which Nature, and Nature's God, has given, and too sacred to
require being mentioned in the natural transactions of these states. Had it been
reserved by a particular article, posterity might imagine we thought it wanted writ-
ten laws for security; an idea we would not choose should disgrace the legisla-
ture of the United States. If in England, "the only operative and efficient check
upon the conduct of administration is the sense of the people at large," what greater
security for the "liberty of the press," would the Centinel wish for, than "the sense
of the people at laige" of these states.
"Uncus," MD. J., Nov. 9, 1787, reprinted in 14 id. at 78.
52 E.g., Letter from George Lee Turberville to James Madison (Apr. 16, 1788),
in 11 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 51, at 23-24.
53 A Federalist wrote: "There is not the least danger of the federal government
compelling persons of a scrupulous conscience to bear arms, as the United States would
be poorly defended by such; besides, troops can, if necessary, be hired for their money."
[Nicholas Collin], Remarks on the Amendments to the Federal Constitution, No. 9, FED. GA-
ZETTE AND PHILADELPHIA EVFNING POST, No. 42, Nov. 18, 1788. In complaining that the
liberty of conscience had not been specified, "An Old Whig" took note of and rejected
the Federalist argument:
I know that a ready answer is at hand, to any objections upon this head. We
shall be told that in this enlightened age, the rights of conscience are perfectly
secure: There is no necessity of guarding them; for no man has the remotest
thoughts of invading them. If this be the case, I beg leave to reply that now is
the very time to secure them.
"An Old Whig," No. V, INDEPENDENT GAZET EER, Nov. 1, 1787, reprinted in 13 DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY, supra note 11, at 538. When interested in obtaining an enumeration of
rights, Madison urged "that the clearest, and strongest provision ought to be made, for
all those essential fights, which have been thought in danger, such as the rights of con-
science, the freedom of the press, trial by jury, exemption from general warrants, &c."
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Mann Randolph (Jan. 13, 1789), in 11 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 51, at 416. Largely for political reasons, Madison urged the adoption
of a bill of rights, even if it included some "unimportant" provisions. CREATING THE BILL
OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 80 (statement of James Madison, June 8, 1789). Similarly,
Washington had written to him: "I see nothing exceptionable in the proposed amend-
ments. Some of them, in my opinion, are importantly necessary, others, though in them-
selves (in my conception) not very essential, are necessary to quiet the fears of some re-
spectable characters and well meaning Men." Letter from George Washington to James
Madison (ca. May 31, 1789), in 12 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 51, at 191.
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of Rights. Congressman Theodore Sedgwick had made a motion
to strike the right of assembly from the proposed enumeration. In
defense of the right of assembly, Egbert Benson of New
York-also a Federalist-explained that the Bill of Rights had been
framed to protect "inherent" or natural rights: "The committee
who framed this report, proceeded on the principle that these
rights belonged to the people; they conceived them to be inher-
ent, and all that they meant to provide against, was their being in-
fringed by the government."54 Sedgwick sharply replied:
[I]f the commmittee were governed by that general principle,
they might have gone into a very lengthy enumeration of
rights; they might have declared that a man should have a
right to wear his hat if he pleased, that he might get up when
he pleased, and go to bed when he thought proper... [Was]
it necessary to enter these trifles in a declaration of rights, in a
government where none of them were intended to be in-
fringed[?]
Sedgwick did not, however, have the last word. In response to his
suggestion that the right of assembly, like the right to wear a hat,
was unlikely to be infringed, John Page of Virginia-another Fed-
eralist-reminded his colleagues that the right to wear a hat had
on occasion been violated:
The gentleman from Massachusetts, (mr. Sedgwick) ... objects
to the clause; because the right is of so trivial a nature; he sup-
poses it no more essential than whether a man has a right to
wear his hat or not, but let me observe to him that such rights
have been opposed, and a man has been obliged to pull off
his hat when he appeared before the face of authority; people
have also been prevented from assembling together on their
lawful occasions, therefore it is well to guard against such
stretches of authority, by inserting the privilege in the declara-
tion of rights; if the people could be deprived of the power of
assembling... they might be deprived of every other privilege
contained in the clause. 6
54 CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTs, supra note 1, at 159 (statement of Egbert Benson,
Aug. 15, 1789).
55 CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 159-60 (statement of Theodore
Sedgwick, Aug. 15, 1789). Sedgmick also argued: "[I]t is certainly a thing that never
would be called in question . . . ." Id. at 159.
56 CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 160 (statement of John Page,
Aug. 15, 1789); see also the responses of Tucker, Gerry, Vining and Hartley. Id. at 160-61.
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Like the right to wear a hat, the right of assembly had sometimes
been infringed; moreover, the right of assembly was essential for
the preservation of other rights. Perhaps, therefore, it was not
trivial.
Sedgwick's ridicule-so adroitly turned against him by
Page-was by no means original. Already during the ratification
controversy, Federalists disparaged various Anti-Federalist proposals
as trivial by comparing them to rights more obviously unsuitable
for enumeration. In the autumn of 1787, in Philadelphia, an
anonymous article in the Pennsylvania Gazette argued that:
The neglect of the Convention to mention the Liberty of the
Press arose from a respect to the state constitutions, in each of
which this palladium of liberty is secured . . . . But supposing
this had not been done, the Liberty of the Press would have been
an inherent and political right, as long as nothing was said
against it. The Convention have said nothing to secure the
privilege of eating and drinking, and yet no man supposes that
right of nature to be endangered by their silence about it.5 7
57 To the Freemen of Pennsylvania, PA. G.AZETTE, Oct. 10, 1787, reprinted in 13 Docu-
MENTARY HISTORY, supra note 11, at 363-64. The passage quoted in the text was reprinted
in various newspapers, not only in Pennsylvania, but also in eight other states. 13 DOCu-
MENrARY HIsTORY, supra note 11, at 366 n.1. The Pennsylvania Gazette article is not as sar-
castic as Webster's known ventures in the trivial rights genre and therefore cannot with-
out further information be attributed to him. All that is known with certainty is that
Webster completed his pamphlet, An Examination into the Leading Principles of the Federal
Constitution, in Philadelphia on October 10-the day the Pennsylvania Gazette article was
published. DOCUMENTr.%Y HIsTORY, supra note 11, Microform Supplement: Pa. no. 142, at
708-09; see also infra note 58.
The gastronomic arguments of the Pennsylvania Gazette were echoed by other Fed-
eralists. A parody of Anti-Federalist complaints asserted "that the state governments will
be very insecure under the new constitution; nay, that a man will not be permitted ei-
ther to eat, drink, or sleep, wear his clothes, as he pleases." "No Conspirator," FED. GA-
ZETTE, Apr. 19, 1788, reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HIsTORY, supra note 11, Microform Sup-
plement: Pa. no. 641, at 2427, cited by Brennan, supra note 2, at 1013 n.274. A Federalist
later observed:
[It is idle to expect that any such barriers can be raised between a government
and its subjects, as to prevent all occasional injury from a bad administration,
b[e]cause the most necessary power may be abused. What is there in the world
that may not? We may kill ourselves by eating! A ph)sician may kill us by opo-
balsam or the Peruvian bark.
[Nicholas Collin], Remarks on the Amendments to the Federal Constitution, No. 28, FED. GA-
ZETTE AND PHILADELPHIA EVENING POsT, No. 119, Feb. 16, 1789. These were not, he
thought, matters that belonged in the Constitution. He concluded by objecting to any
amendments and saying that "[i]f we must at all amend, I pray for merely amusing
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In other words, publishing, like eating and drinking, was a free-
dom unaffected by the Constitution, because nothing was said in
the enumeration of powers that would permit the federal govern-
ment to legislate on the subject.
On the same day that the Pennsylvania Gazette article men-
tioned the right to eat and drink, Noah Webster happened to be
in Philadelphia, where he was completing a pamphlet in favor of
ratification. In it, he provided another example of the trivial rights
genre:
It is said that there is no provision made in the new constitu-
tion against a standing army in time of peace. Why do not
people object that no provision is made against the introduc-
tion of a body of Turkish Janizaries; or against making the
Alcoran the rule of faith and practice, instead of the Bible?
The answer to such objections is simply this-no such provision
is necessary .... Pennsylvania and North Carolina, I believe,
are the only states that have provided against this danger at all
events. Other states have declared that "no standing armies
shall be kept up without the consent of the legislature." But,
this leaves the power entirely in the hands of the legislature.
Many of the states have made no provision against this evil.
What hazards these states suffer! Why does not a man pass a
law in his family that no armed soldier shall be quartered in
his house by his consent? The reason is very plain: no man will
suffer his liberty to be abridged, or endangered-his disposi-
tion and his power are uniformly, opposed to any infringement
of his rights. In the same manner, the principles and habits, as
well as the power of the Americans are directly opposed to
standing armies; and there is as little necessity to guard against
them by positive constitutions, as to prohibit the establishment
of the Mahometan religion.'
amendments; a little frothy' garnish. But why do we not rather sit down as brothers, and
feast on the substantial meat, for which we have fasted so long!" Id.
58 "A CITIZEN OF PHILADELPHIA" [NOAH WEBSTER], AN EXAMINATION INTO THE LEAD-
ING PRINCIPLES OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 3637 (1787), reprinted in DOCUMENTARY
HIsTORY, supra note 11, Microform Supplement: Pa. no. 142, at 744-45. According to
Webster's diary, the pamphlet was published on October 17, 1787. Id. at 709.
Brutus responded:
A writer, in favor of this system, treats this objection as a ridiculous one.
He supposes it would be as proper to provide against the introduction of Turk-
ish janizaries, or against making the Alcoran a rule of faith.
From the positive, and dogmatic manner, in which this author delivers his
opinions, and answers objections made to his sentiments-one would conclude,
that he was some pedantic pedagogue who had been accustomed to deliver his
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On account of the people's "principles and habits" and their un-
willingness to suffer their liberty to be abridged, the rights Anti-
Federalists wanted to enumerate were no more likely to be at risk
than the right to be free of an Islamic establishment. Therefore,
constitutional provisions specifying these rights were unneces-
sary.5
9
In the wake of Webster's ridicule, Federalists appear to have
taken pleasure in finding similarly ludicrous comparisons. For
example, commenting on the Anti-Federalist objection that the
liberty of the press was not enumerated, Oliver Ellsworth dryly
observed:
Nor is liberty of conscience, or of matrimony, or of burial of
the dead; it is enough that Congress have no power to prohibit
either, and can have no temptation. This objection is answered
in that the states have all the power originally, and Congress
have only what the states grant them.'
dogmas to pupils, who always placed implicit faith in what he delivered.
But, why is this provision so ridiculous? [Blecause, says this author, it is
unnecessary. But, why is it unnecessary? "[B]ecause, the principles and habits, as
well as the power of the Americans are directly opposed to standing armies; and
there is as little necessity to guard against them by positive constitutions, as to
prohibit the establishment of the Mahometan religion." It is admitted then, that
a standing army in time of peace, is an evil. I ask then, why should this gov-
ernment be authorised to do evil? . . . [T]here is little reason to expect, that
the interest of the people and their rulers will be the same.
Besides, if the habits and sentiments of the people of America are to be
relied upon, as the sole security against the encroachment of their rulers, all re-
strictions in constitutions are unnecessary; nothing more is requisite, than to
declare who shall be authorized to exercise the powers of government ....
This I suppose to be the sentiments of this author, as it seems to be of many
of the advocates of this new system.
"Brutus," No. IX, N.Y. J., Jan. 17, 1788, reptinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
11, at 395-96. Another Anti-Federalist wrote:
I know that a ready answer is at hand, to any objections on this head. We shall
be told that in this enlightened age, the rights of conscience are perfectly se-
cure: There is no necessity of guarding them; for no man has the remotest
thoughts of invading them. If this be the case, I beg leave to reply that now is
the very time to secure them.
"An Old Whig," No. 5, PHILADEI.PHIA INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER, Nov. 1, 1787, reprinted in
13 DOCUMENTARY HIsTORY, supra note 11, at 538.
59 Apparently taking his cue from Webster, Hugh Williamson argued: "We have been
told that the Liberty of the Press is not secured by the New Constitution. Be pleased to
examine the plan, and you will find that the Liberty of the Press and the laws of Ma-
homet are equally affected by it." Hugh Williamson, Speech at Edenton, N.C., Nov. 8,
1787, in N.Y. DAILY ADVERTISER, Feb. 25-27, 1788, reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 11, at 202.
60 "A Landholder" [Oliver Ellsworth], No. VI, Ct. Courant, Dec. 10, 1787, in 3 Doc-
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Like the rights "of conscience," "of matrimony" and "of burial of
the dead," the freedom of the press was, according to Ellsworth, a
right that Congress had neither the power nor the temptation to
prohibit. Therefore, however valuable, it did not require enumer-
ation. With an echo, perhaps, of Ellsworth's allusion to matrimony,
another Connecticut Federalist noted that "unless we suppose the
institution of marriage will be abolished, consequent of a federal
government, we cannot suppose the trial by jury will be infringed
upon .... "'
Returning to the theme of trivial rights, Webster sarcastically
attacked the eighth proposal of the Anti-Federalist minority of the
Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention:
But to complete the list of unalienable rights, you would
insert a clause in your declaration, that every body shall, in good
weather, hunt on his own land, and catch fish in rivers that are
public property. Here, Gentlemen, you must have exerted the
whole force of your genius! Not even the all-important subject of
.legislating for a world can restrain my laughter at this clause! As
a supplement to that article of your bill of rights, I would sug-
,gest the following restriction:-'That Congress shall never re-
strain any inhabitant of America from eating or drinking, at
seasonable times, or prevent his lying on his left side, in a long
winter's night, or even on his back, when he is fatigued by
lying on his right.'-This article is of just as much consequence
as the 8th clause of your proposed bill of rights.62
Webster also asked Anti-Federalists why they did not seek clauses
guaranteeing a man's right to till his own land or to milk his own
COWS.
63
Why had Anti-Federalists sought to enumerate the right to
hunt on one's own land? Webster's answer, far from being amus-
ing, was, in fact, a thoughtful observation about the changes in
society and landholding since feudal times:
But to be more serious, Gentlemen, you must have had in
idea the forest-laws in Europe, when you inserted that article;
UMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 11, at 490.
61 "A Citizen," NORWICH PACKET, Jan. 17, 1788, reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 11, Microform Supplement: Ct. no. 73, at 310, cited by Brennan, supra note 2,
at 1012 n.268.
62 "America" [Noah Webster], N.Y. DAILY ADVERTISER, Dec. 31, 1787, reprinted in 15
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 11, at 199.
63 Sex infia note 64.
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for no circumstance that ever took place in America, could
have suggested the thought of a declaration in favor of hunting
and fishing .... The Barons in Europe procured forest-laws to
secure the right of hunting on their own land, from the intru-
sion of those who had no property in lands. But the distribu-
tion of land in America, not only supersedes the necessity of
any laws upon this subject, but renders them absolutely tri-
fling.'
64 15 DocuNIENTAR" HISTORY, supra note 11, at 199-200. The ellipsis contained the
following:
Will you forever persist in error? Do you not reflect that the state of property
in America, is directly the reverse of what it is in Europe? Do you not consider,
that the forest-laws in Europe originated in feudal tyranny, of which not a trace
is to be found in America? Do you not know that in this country almost every
farmer is Lord of his own soil? That instead of suffering under the oppression
of a Monarch and Nobles, a class of haughty masters, totally independent of the
people, almost every man in America is a Lord hinsef-enjoying his property in
fee? Where then the necessity of laws to secure hunting and fishing? You may
just as well ask for a clause, giving license for every man to till his oron land, or
milk his own cows.
Id. The passage quoted in the text continued: "The same laws which secure the property
in land, secure to the owner the right of using it as he pleases." Id. at 200.
After noting that Federalists had answered the "many objections" to the new federal
government----"such as the want of a bill of rights; the neglect of a declaration in favour
of the liberty of the press; the danger of our religious liberties, &c. &c."-a letter to the
printers of the Pennsylvania Gazette sarcastically drew attention to some objections that, it
said, were even more serious and that therefore required a Federalist response:
I beg leave to mention several objections which I have lately heard against it,
which are of more weight than any thing which has yet appeared, and which I
should be glad to see answered by some one of your numerous federal corre-
spondents.
Having lately travelled through Montgomery county, I stopped at a' tavern
in the neighborhood of __, where I met with a number of persons who had
assembled together, for the purpose of settling some matters relative to the . . .
election of members of [the] Convention . . . . The)' immediately began a con-
versation with me about the new government, and with one voice condemned it
as a vile system of tyranny. I asked them what their objections to it were. One
of them, who I was told, was a schoolmaster, retailed all the objections that are
mentioned in the Centinel with a good deal of vehemence. As soon as he had
finished, a second person complained that nothing was said in the new Consti-
tution about the liberty of fishing and hunting, which were unalienable rights,
and that we should from this omission, soon have game laws in the United
States. I found this man was a sportsman, and that he had hunted and fished
away a -valuable plantation. A third, who was the elder of a Presbyterian meet-
ing, said that no testimony %%-as borne in the new government against the the-
ater, and that now we should have plays and players in the state of Pennsylva-
nia. A fourth objected to it, because no notice was taken of the Sabbath day. A
fifth exclaimed against it, because a Roman Catholic and a Jew stood as good a
chance of being President of the United States as a Christian or a Protestant. A
sixth, who was a weaver, abused it, because it contained nothing it favour of
[Vol. 70:1
TRIVIAL RIGHTS
Webster added intelligent sociological analysis to his caustic hu-
mor.
In contrast, many Federalists who commented on trivial rights
aspired merely to ridicule their opponents. For example, Hugh
Henry Brackenridge derisively asked "if in this constitution there is
the least provision for the privilege of shaving the beard? Or is
there any mode laid down to take the measure of a pair of
breeches?"6 Years later, in justifying this less-than-dignified contri-
bution to the ratification controversy, Brackenridge explained:
[It] is a sample, perhaps a caricature, of the objections to the
adopting the Federal Constitution, as they appeared in the
publications of the time. Ridicule is not the test of truth, but it
may be employed to expose error, and on this occasion it
seemed not amiss to use it a little, as a great object was at
American manufactures. A seventh, who I was told had lately broken a new
waggon in driving it over a piece of bad road, complained, that it contained
nothing in favour of repairing our roads. Many other objections of a like nature
were made, which I do not now recollect.
I hope Mr. Wilson, at our next town meeting, will answer those which I
have mentioned .... "
"An Enquirer," N.H. SPY, Dec. 4, 1787, vol. III. no.12 ("From the Pennsylvania Gazette"),
cited in MORTON BORDEN, JEWS, TURKS AND INFIDELS 134, n.43 (1984); see also, e.g., Alex-
ander White, To the Citizens of Virginia, WINCHF=ER, VA. GAZETrE, Feb. 22, 1788, repninted
in 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 11, at 404; ALLAN NEVINs, THE AMERICAN STATES
DURING AND AFrER THE REVOLUTION, 1775-1789, at 240 (1924).
65 Hugh Henry Brackenridge, Cursory Rema,*s on the Federal Constitution, PITTSBURGH
GAZETTE, March 1, 1788, reprinted in HUGH HENRY BRACKENRIDGE, GAZETTE PUBLICATIONS
78-79 (1806). Satirizing some Anti-Federalist complaints that the Constitution did not
prevent Jews, Turks and infidels from being elected to the Presidency, Brackenridge
mockingly appealled to *other prejudices:
The first thing that strikes a diligent observer, is the want of precaution with re-
spect to the sex of the president. Is it provided that he shall be of the male
gender? . . . Without a[n] . . . exclusion what shall we think, if in progress of
time we should come to have an old woman at the head of our affairs? But what
security have we that he shall be a white wan? What would be the national dis-
grace if he should be elected from one of the southern states, and a vile negro
should come to'nile over us? ... But is there any security that he shall be a
freeeman? Who knows but the electors at a future period, in days of corruption
may pick up a man's servant, a convict perhaps, and give him the dominion? Is
an) care taken that he shall be a man of perfect parts? Moses ...precluded
those labouring under any incapacity from entering the congregation of the
Lord. Shall we in affairs of a civil nature, leave a door open to bastards, eu-
nuchs, and the devil knows what
Id. at 77.
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stake, and much prejudice or willful misrepresentation to be
encountered.
66
Ridicule had its place even in serious debate.
That unenumerated rights were not at risk because they were
protected by the spirit of the people and by the Constitution's
grant of powers was a serious argument. Yet Federalists used bur-
lesque illustrations to thrust this point home. By listing some of
the rights Anti-Federalists were willing to leave unmentioned, Fed-
eralists suggested that the rights Anti-Federalists did mention were
also unworthy of enumeration. As Iredell warned: "Let any one
make what collection or enumeration of rights he pleases, I will
immediately mention twenty or thirty more rights not contained in
it.,67
IV. CONCLUSION
Both Federalists and Anti-Federalists agreed that the rights of
Americans were innumerable. In particular, they agreed that they
had countless natural rights. The liberty of individuals in the state
of nature-in the absence of government-included the right to
eat, sleep, shave and do any number of other things of which
human beings were capable, and most of this liberty was not to be
surrendered to the federal government.
Therefore, any attempt to specify the rights retained by the
people would, almost inevitably, specify too little. Even if the Con-
stitution were to be the length of a book, it would not be long
enough adequately to list rights. Consequently, when drafting the
federal Constitution, Madison, Wilson and other Federalists pre-
ferred an enumeration of powers to an enumeration of rights. As
James Wilson put it, "an omission in the enumeration of the pow-
ers of government is neither so dangerous, nor important, as an
omission in the enumeration of the rights of the people." By enu-
merating federal powers rather than the rights reserved from the
government, the framers and advocates of the Constitution could
establish a general reservation of liberty. By specifying powers, they
could generally reserve rights.
Yet Anti-Federalists insisted upon an enumeration of rights.
Doubtful whether the people's virtue, the enumeration of powers,
66 Id. at 76.
67 4 EL.LIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 167 (statement of James Iredell at N.C.
Rat. Convention, July 29, 1788).
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or other restraints could limit the federal government, Anti-Fed-
eralists assumed that only such rights as were listed would really
be protected from that government. Only the rights mentioned
were certain of being preserved. Therefore, even if Federalist con-
cerns about the enumeration of rights were justified, "half a loaf'
was "better than no bread."
Of course, as the Federalists predicted, if some rights were to
be listed, Americans would face problems with other,
unenumerated rights. Federalists and even some Anti-Federalists
were concerned about the fate of the unlisted rights, particularly
the innumerable rights that were part of the undifferentiated
natural liberty not sacrificed to the federal government. If, as in
state constitutions, the rights retained were listed, was all other
liberty impliedly sacrificed to the government? Would "everything
that is not enumerated" be "presumed to be given"? To avoid this
implied sacrifice of unenumerated rights, Madison proposed what
became the Ninth Amendment, according to which the enumera-
tion of rights was not be construed to deny or disparage others re-
tained by the people-the rights retained being those reserved by
the enumeration of powers. Although many modem scholars have
understood the unenumerated rights of the Ninth Amendment to
be vague, unwritten rights, the unenumerated rights were none
other than those reserved by the grant of powers in the U.S. Con-
stitution.
Thus, the Constitution reserved rights in two diametrically
opposite ways. By specifying powers, it reserved to the people the
undifferentiated mass of liberty they did not grant to the federal
government-a general reservation of rights confirmed and pre-
served through the Ninth Amendment. By specifying rights, the
Constitution reserved some particular rights so that, for these,
Americans would not have to rely merely upon the enumeration
of powers. The distinct advantage of each method of reserving
rights was repeatedly pointed out by its proponents. Federalists
advocated the enumeration of powers as a means of protecting
innumerable rights, and Anti-Federalists advocated the enumera-
tion of rights as a means of removing any doubts about the pro-
tection of a very small number of rights.
If the Constitution was to have not only a general reservation
of unenumerated rights but also a particularized reservation of
specified rights, then it was necessary to determine which rights
were to have that particularized protection. For Anti-Federalists,
who had no confidence in either the virtue of the people or the
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enumeration of powers as limitations on the federal government,
there was every reason for a long list of rights, leading some Anti-
Federalists to seek the enumeration of all rights not surrendered
to government, "even every the most trivial." Most Anti-Federalists,
however, recognized that only "important" or "essential" rights
could be listed, and it was on the basis of this common assump-
tion that Federalists could denounce the triviality of some of the
proposals for a bill of rights.
To late-twentieth century scholars, the gleeful sarcasm of Fed-
eralists about trivial rights may seem undignified and callous. How
could the founding fathers have been so indifferent to so many
important rights, including many of the non-political rights that
today are a matter of profound concern? The answer to this ques-
tion reveals as much about us as about them-as much about our
interpretation of the Constitution as about their drafting of it.
Today, in both practice and theory, we have largely aban-
doned one of the Constitution's two methods of reserving
rights-the method that reserved the larger number of rights.
Indeed, the general protection of unenumerated rights by means
of the enumeration of powers has been so thoroughly undermined
that many modem legal scholars may wonder how it could once
have been taken seriously. The Constitution's enumeration of
powers is hardly even discussed as a means of reserving rights, and
we depend almost exclusively upon our Constitution's brief enu-
meration of rights.'
Our dependence upon a brief list of rights is one reason why
unwritten constitutional protections for other rights may appear
attractive and why the Federalist taunts about trivial rights may
seem out of place. If we take for granted that the only protection
for our rights was the Bill of Rights, the late-eighteenth century
68 For some scholars who do address the role of the enumeration of powers, see
supra note 8.
Of course, the enumeration of powers protected not only unenumerated rights but
also, to some extent, rights that were listed. For example, it protected the press and,
indeed, provided a rather different and in some ways more extensive protection for the
press than did the First Amendment. For this reason, many early defenders of the press
preferred to rely upon the enumeration of powers. See, e.g., HORTENTIUS [GEORGE HAY],
AN ESSAY ON THE LIBERTY OF THE PREss 5-32 (1799); TUNIS WORTMAN, A TREATISE CON-
CERNING POLITIcAL ENQUIRY AND THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS 207-32 (1800); Ky. Res. (Nov.
10, 1798), reprinted in THE VIRGINIA REPORT OF 1799-1800 162-63 (1850); see also Philip A.
Hamburger, Natural Rights and Positive Lany: A Connent on Profssor McAffee's Paper, 16 S.
ILL. U. L.J. 307, 310-11 (1992). Having abandoned the protection for the press provided
by the enumeration of powers, courts have attempted to expand the protection for the
press provided by the Bill of Rights.
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discussions about trivial rights may give the impression that the
framers and ratifiers of the Constitution and Bill of Rights were
well aware of our myriad rights but callously omitted most of them
as trivial.
Yet for the Federalists, who ratified the Constitution and to a
considerable extent drafted the Bill of Rights, less was at stake
than for the Anti-Federalists or for us. For most Federalists, the
Bill of Rights was at best merely an additional, supplementary pro-
tection-not strictly necessary, except to reassure opponents of the
Constitution that the rights they considered essential were not at
risk. Even Madison said of his own proposal that it included some
rights that were "rather unimportant."69 He defended the mea-
sure mainly on the ground that it would provide reassurance."
Thus, in 1789, when Federalists worried about which rights were
to be included or excluded, and Sedgwick said that the right of
assembly was as trivial as the right of wearing a hat, the question
was not so much whether as how these rights would be protected.
Would they be specifically reserved by enumeration? Or would
they be reserved as part of the general, undifferentiated freedom
defined by the enumeration of powers? In either case, they would
be most substantially protected by the people's spirit of liberty.
On account of the enumeration of powers and the people's
virtue or spirit of liberty, Federalists suspected that many of the
rights Anti-Federalists wanted to have listed were unlikely to be in-
fringed and in this sense were too trivial to be specified. These
rights-like the rights of eating, of drinking and of sleeping in
varied positions-were undoubtedly valuable. But they were "trivi-
al" in the sense that they were not likely to be in danger. If Anti-
Federalists were willing to allow the rights of eating and drinking
to be unenumerated, why not also the freedom of the press? Pre-
cisely because the rights of eating and drinking were so important,
Federalists went out of their way to use them *as examples.
69 CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 80 (statement of James Madison,
June 8, 1789). This was a common sentiment among Federalists. For example, George
Washington wrote to Madison, "I see nothing exceptionable in the proposed amend-
ments. Some of them, in my opinion, are importantly necessary, others, though in them-
selves (in my conception) not very essential, are necessary to quiet the fears of some
respectable characters and well meaning Men." Letter from George Washington to James
Madison (ca. May 31, 1789), in 12 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 51, at 191.
70 CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 80 (statement of James Madison,
June 8, 1789).
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Of course, Anti-Federalists distinguished the freedom of the
press from the right to eat and thereby distinguished between the
important and the trivial in a different way than did many Federal-
ists. Whereas Federalists drew attention to the rights that were
"trivial" in the sense that they were not likely to be infringed,
Anti-Federalists emphasized the rights, so often attacked by govern-
ment, that were essential for protecting other rights. These essen-
tial rights, they argued, required enumeration to preserve them
from a government whose ill-defined powers would be interpreted
expansively.
Anti-Federalists not only questioned the Constitution's method
of reserving rights but also raised doubts about the various other,
largely unwritten means by which Federalists hoped rights would
be protected. In mocking trivial rights, Federalists focused on one
of these unwritten means of protecting rights; they argued that
the people's virtue or spirit of liberty rendered an enumeration of
rights unimportant. Anti-Federalists, however, were loath to rely
upon the people's virtue or sense of freedom. They demanded a
bill of rights on the ground that political, cultural and other
unwritten restraints would not remain efficacious against, or even
survive under, the new government.
Moreover, some Anti-Federalists understood-what most Feder-
alists refused to acknowledge-that a bill of rights could stimulate
and reenforce the cultural and political restraints on government.
According to some Anti-Federalists, a bill of rights might preserve
essential rights from the federal government even as the people's
virtue declined, for an enumeration of rights would, among other
things, encourage a popular appreciation of the listed rights. It
would "establish in the minds of the people truths and principles
which they might never otherwise have thought of, or soon for-
got .... What is the usefulness of a truth in theory, unless it
exists constantly in the minds of the people . . . ?"' Drawing up-
on this sort of argument, Madison additionally justified a bill of
rights as a means of discouraging a majority from acting oppres-
sively through government: "The political truths declared in that
solemn manner acquire by degrees the character of fundamental
maxims of free Government, and as they become incorporated
with the national sentiment, counteract the impulses of interest
71 "Federal Farmer," January 20, 1788, relninted in 2 THE COMPLETE ArrI-FEDERALIST,
supra note 29, at 324; see also "Cato" [George Clinton], reprinted in Ess s ON THE CON-
STITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 266 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1892).
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and passion."72  Madison defended his amendments on the
ground that "as they have a tendency to impress some degree of
respect for them, to establish the public opinion in their favor,
and rouse the attention of the whole community, it may be one
means to controul the majority from those acts to which they
might be otherwise inclined.""3
Although these varied benefits of a bill of rights went unac-
knowledged by the Federalists who railed against the enumeration
of trivia, and although we may be grateful that the Federalists
eventually responded to the demands for a bill of rights, the abra-
sive Federalist banter about eating, sleeping and shaving remains a
source of illumination. Notwithstanding that it was tendentious in
its failure to acknowledge the truths espoused by opponents of the
Constitution, the Federalist raillery was and still is a pointed re-
minder of other truths. It can remind us why the Constitution did
not enumerate all of our rights and how, nonetheless, our
unenumerated rights were to be protected. In this respect, trivial
rights are not unimportant. As Hugh Henry Brackenridge wrote,
"Ridicule is not the test of truth, but it may be employed to ex-
pose error, and on this occasion it seemed not amiss to use it a
little ......
72 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (OcL 17, 1788), in 11 MADISON
PAPERS, sup-a note 51, at 298-99. This quotation was preceded by the following:
[I~n a popular Government, the political and physical power may be considered
as vested in the same hands, that is in the majority of the people, and conse-
quently the tyrannical will of the sovereign is not [to] be controuled by the
dread of an appeal to any other force within the community. what use then it
may be asked can a bill of rights serve in popular Governments? I answer the
two following which though less essential than in other Governments, sufficiently
recommend the precaution.
The quotation in the text continued:
2. Altho' it be generally true as above stated that the danger of oppression lies
in the interested majorities of the people rather than in usurped acts of the
Government, yet there may be occasions on which the evil may spring from the
latter sources; and on such, a bill of rights will be a good ground for an appeal
to the sense of the community ... 
Id.
73 CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 82 (statement of James Madison,
June 8, 1789).
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